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In 1993, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg offered feminist scholars a parable about
their ambition to define the terms on which the debate over sex discrimination will
proceed within juridical and popular culture. During a speech she gave at Columbia
Law School, Ginsburg explained why, during the 1970's, she started using the word
"gender" rather than "sex" in the briefs she was filing in the sex discrimination cases
decided ultimately by the United States Supreme Court. As Justice Ginsburg
recalled:
"I owe it all to my secretary at Columbia Law School, who said, 'I'm typing
all these briefs and articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex, is on every
page.... Don't you know that those nine men-they hear that word, and
their first association is not the way you want them to be thinking? Why
don't you use the word gender? It is a grammatical term and it will ward off
distracting associations.'
' '
Public accounts of Justice Ginsburg's lecture do not indicate whether she accepted
this advice for the reason her secretary advanced or whether she began using the term
"gender" for other reasons of her own. Nor do the accounts mention whether
Ginsburg offered an exegesis of her story or whether she left her listeners to rely on
their own interpretive devices. Assuming that we are meant to tease out the meaning
of the story on our own, more than one signification comes to mind. At perhaps the
most obvious level, the story provides ironic insight into the aridity, even futility, of
some academic disputes. Thus, the story tends to discredit the scholarly endeavor to
assign a distinct meaning to cases that speak of "gender," as opposed to "sex," dis-
crimination (and vice versa),2 since the story informs us that the word "gender"
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1. Catharine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains Origin of Sex, Gender, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A28.
2. As Mary Anne Case has explained, feminist theorists usually use the word "sex" to "refer[] to the
anatomical and physiological distinctions between men and women; 'gender,' by contrast is used to refer to the
cultural overlay on those anatomical and physiological distinctions." Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1,
10 (1995). By contrast, Catharine MacKinnon offers this explanation for why she "use[s] sex and gender relatively
interchangeably":
Much has been made of the distinction between sex and gender. Sex is thought the more biological,
gender the more social. The relation of each to sexuality varies. Since I believe sexuality is fundamental
to gender and fundamentally social, and that biology is its social meaning in the system of sex
inequality, which is a social and political system that does not rest independently on biological
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found its way into the judicial canon for reasons having nothing to do with the parti-
cular definition that judges associated with that word, as opposed to its synonyms.
The word "gender" was adopted not as a result of the courts' careful exercise of
dictional authority, let alone in response to academic theorizing about the appropriate
scope of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the Justices thoughtlessly imitated the
nomenclature employed by an influential party who intended thereby not to redefine
her cause of action, but merely to eliminate from her pleadings and scholarship
connotations that she deemed irrelevant. Moreover, within the confines of Ginsburg's
amusing vignette, her decision to sponsor the term "gender" was more serendipitous
than calculating, though we would need to know more about her relationship with her
secretary, and, indeed, more about the secretary, before deciding on precisely what
ground this momentous decision was made.
Despite (or, perhaps, because of) this first lesson about our relative linguistic
impotence, the story has piqued the interest of more than one author, some of whom
criticize Ginsburg for suggesting that "sex" and "gender" are interchangeable terms3
and others of whom find her suggestion praiseworthy.4 (For reasons that are not
stated, this commentary ignores altogether the figure of the secretary and attributes
to Ginsburg alone authority over the content of her pleadings.) As developed by
Mary Anne Case, the feminist critique of Ginsburg's story is compelling. Perhaps,
Ginsburg's-use of the word "gender" did serve the interests of her cause in the short
term. By sparing those nine men the embarrassment of being reminded of sexual
matters when adjudicating her cases,5 we may imagine that she assisted them to con-
sider thoughtfully and respectfully the precise legal questions she presented. How-
ever, in the long run, her decision to encourage them to conflate the words "sex" and
"gender" has disserved the interests of feminism because it has contributed to wide-
spread "analytic confusion" in the sex discrimination case law.6 Such criticism is
valuable in that it exposes the ways in which terminological imprecision has allowed
courts to continue to devalue that which culture associates with the feminine, despite
contemporary constitutional and statutory guarantees that protect females from
discrimination. However, this criticism does not go far enough since it ignores the
questions that Ginsburg's story raises about the political, cultural, and psychological
pressures that induce feminists deliberately to create these terminological lacunae,
which then inhibit our efforts to eliminate misogyny from the law. At this level, the
story invites us to contemplate the ways of thinking about sexuality that prompt
differences in any respect, the sex/gender distinction looks like a nature/culture distinction.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS
635, 636 n.1 (1983).
3. See Case, supra note 2, at 10.
4. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL L. REV. 1,325-26 (1995) ("Mhe
use of gender, though originally idiosyncratic, is both accurate and proper.").
5. See Case, supra note 2, at 10.
6. See id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
women to adopt obfuscatory strategies, such as that apparently pursued by Ginsburg,
when talking to men, or at least male lawmakers, about sex. According to the account
of sexuality that Ginsburg attributes to her secretary's instruction, for example,
women have been and should be reluctant to talk to men about sex-indeed, they
should not even utter the word "sex" in the presence of men-because the word
conjures up images potent enough to divert men from the merits of the cause they
must resolve.
With this account in mind, we may find in the story still another, more poignant,
lesson, as it directs our attention to the position of women who seek legal redress for
injuries caused by sexual intercourse. There is no way for these women to sanitize
their lawsuits by scrubbing out the word "sex" and its disturbing connotations-they
have no choice but to talk about "sex" in the sense that Ginsburg believed might
jeopardize the success of her cause. Thus, we must inquire, precisely what are the
"distracting associations" that these women cannot avoid producing? Ginsburg was
reluctant to describe explicitly (or at all) the images that she and/or her secretary had
in their view, but she elsewhere suggested that they amounted to erotica offensive
enough to be deemed obscene under First Amendment standards.7 Finally, consider
the role that these obscene images will play in cases where women seek a remedy for
injurious sexual intercourse. For these women, the sexual apparitions that Ginsburg
desired to elude will not represent mere "distractions" from which most men pre-
sumably will understand that they must wrest their roving attention. Rather, the word
"sex" and, more specifically, the images it produces will displace the women's own
accounts and come to represent in the lawmakers' minds' eyes the injurious sexual
experiences for which the women seek redress. Thus, Ginsburg's story instructs that
our language, surely a cultural and not an individual production, has the power to
determine the content of personal experiences that individual women desire to define
by and for themselves.
7. When describing for the Columbia Law School audience her secretary's idea that the word "gender" is
preferable to the word "sex" because it allows the speaker to avoid certain "distracting associations," Ginsburg left
her listeners to imagine for themselves the content of those associations. In an article she published in 1975,
however, Ginsburg identified more precisely the associations she had in mind, namely, erotic materials offensive
enough to be deemed obscene for purposes of Fast Amendment analysis. Yet, even there, she used language that
is vague, allusive, and indirect, When describing the meaning that she suggests men attribute to "sex," Ginsburg
remarked, "For impressionable minds, the word 'sex' may conjure up improper images of issues like those that the
Supreme Court has left to 'contemporary community standards:'" Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme
Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SuP. Cr. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973)). Among other things, the reader must wonder, in what sense is "sex" an "image" of an "issue"? Or, for that
matter, in what sense are obscene productions "issues"? It is interesting to remark that, whereas Catharine
MacKinnon frequently appears to conflate heterosexual intercourse with pornographic representations of
intercourse, see, e.g., CATHARIN A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FmNSTTHEORY OFTHE STATE 197 (1989), Justice
Ginsburg here conflates intercourse with its representation within obscene materials.
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II.
We may begin to imagine, then, how little control an individual victim has over
the disposition of a rape complaint. Neither the experiential content of her complaint
nor the legal standards against which it is judged are subjects of which she is the
master. For one thing, by using the word "sex," the complainant unleashes images
of the sexual violation that are deeply disturbing, but, if Ginsburg's account is
accurate, they probably are not disturbing in the way that the complainant intends.
Second, as Ginsburg's allusion to the designation "obscene" implies,' these images
carry with them cultural judgments about their immoral and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, illegal status. To be more precise, Ginsburg's story suggests that the woman
is forced to provide a representation of her sexual activity that itself qualifies as
illegal. Since that is the case, we must further imagine that law enforcement
authorities would be inclined to approach the task of adjudicating her complaint with
some measure of skepticism, if not hostility.
Significantly, Justice Ginsburg's provocative suggestion about the illegal status
of the sexual images produced by the rape complainant's language reminds us that,
for centuries, the underlying sexual activity that she reported also was a crime. Here,
I refer not to the familiar criminal character of forced sexual intercourse (i.e., to the
rape), but to the guilty status of non-marital sexual intercourse. Up until very recently
and continuing in some jurisdictions today, our penal laws forbade not only rape, but
also fornication and adultery, which consist of consensual sexual intercourse outside
of marriage? As long as fornication and adultery are criminalized, every rape pro-
secution contains the following peculiar feature: the woman who comes forward to
accuse a man of rape necessarily is thereby confessing that she participated in an act
of illegal intercourse, though she further charges that her participation was un-
willing.' ° Therefore, as a practical matter, by bringing a rape complaint, the woman
automatically finds herself confronting a unique dilemma: in order to obtain a
favorable judgment on her complaint, she first must persuade the authorities that she
8. Ginsburg is not the only judge to associate the word "sex" with obscenity. In the first sentence of Sex
and Reason, Richard Posner makes the same connection. Thus, Posner commences his investigation of sexuality
with this defensive assertion: "Anyone in our society who wants to write about sex without being accused of
prurient interest had better explain what the source of his interest in the subject is." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 1 (1992).
9. For a helpful and thorough summary of the contemporary status of this country's fornication and
adultery laws, see RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIE TO AMEwICA'S SEX LAWS 98-110
(1996). For fascinating historical treatments of the enforcement of those laws in the Puritan colonies, see CORNELIA
HUGHES DAYTON, WoMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GmNDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN CONNECTICtrr, 1639-1789 (1995);
ROGER THOM SON, SEX IN MIDDLESEX: POPULAR MORES IN A MASSACHUSETTS COUNTY, 1649-1699 (1986).
10. As Rollin Perkins and Ronald Boyce remind us, "an essential element" of the traditional rape offense
"is that the sex be unlawful." ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONAtD N. BOYCE, CPRMNAL LAW 203 (1982). In order to
establish this "essential element," the prosecutor must prove that the sex act alleged to constitute a rape was "extra-
marital" because "[i]n fact, any act of extra-marital sex is unlawful." Id.
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should not be blamed, together with the man she has accused, for the act of illegal
intercourse.
As it turns out, this observation about the guilty character of non-marital
intercourse possesses enormous explanatory power when we attempt to justify the
substantive elements of the contemporary rape offense. Of course, I use the word
"justify" advisedly since numerous legal scholars have concluded that the only
explanation for the content of rape doctrine is the wholly unjustifiable sexism of
those who make and enforce the criminal law. The critique appears to enjoy wide-
spread support," and, certainly, I concur in its essential political premises. However,
the critique is unsatisfying and, perhaps for some, unpersuasive 2 because its
governing value judgment, namely, that the objective of rape law is to protect the
right of women to sexual self-governance, appears to be wildly at odds with the
values of the culture from which the prohibition emerged. In this essay, I will begin
to develop an alternative account of rape doctrine, one that endeavors to be faithful
to the ways of thinking about sexuality that supported the prohibitions on fornication
and adultery, as well as on rape. My argument applies to the peculiar case of rape the
insights found in Justice Ginsburg's story about the signification of "sex." Thus, I
will suggest that, when law enforcement authorities hear the word "rape," "their first
association is not the way [feminists] want them to be thinking." According to the
feminist account, a woman uses the word "rape" to stipulate that a man has violated
her right to choose or refuse sexual intercourse for herself.' 3 When we examine rape
doctrine carefully, however, we discover that the word traditionally has connoted
sexual activity over which the woman has no legitimate choice to exercise because
the activity is forbidden by the criminal law. For law enforcement authorities who
hear the word "rape," therefore, the initial impulse is to determine, not whether the
accused man violated a woman's right to sexual self-determination, but whether she
who accuses him should be excused for her involvement in the otherwise criminal
sexual connection.
11. At least, Donald Dripps is confident that "the values [rape] law has protected for millennia are not values
any legal scholar would defend." Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1783 (1992).
12. A number of commentators have remarked that, although there has been widespread reform of rape
statutes in recent years, enforcement of the prohibition continues to be impeded by the same types of attitudes that
thwarted prosecutions in priorgenerations. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 813 (1991)
("In fact, the [rape] laws were changed, in virtually every state. So why wasn't the problem solved?"); Lynne
Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993) ("mwo
decades of feminist law reform efforts to hold men responsible for raping women have yielded disappointing
results."); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape
Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1991) ("Despite these reforms.... numerous impediments to
the successful prosecution of rape remain, hindering the eradication of this form of terrorism against women.").




Although the contemporary critique of rape law is voluminous and encompasses
numerous procedural, evidentiary, and doctrinal objections, the salient features of the
critique may be captured for my purposes by a brief discussion of the critics' assault
on the substantive elements of rape. The political premises animating these criticisms
are that sexual activity is a good that adult partners should have the authority to pur-
sue without substantial interference by the state and, indeed, that state intervention
should be limited to ensuring that sexual exchanges are free from the kinds of
coercive pressures found sufficient to invalidate the transfer of other types of goods.
Because of their cultural and, perhaps, biological predispositions, men are inclined
to be more aggressive than women in initiating and consummating sexual inter-
course, and so rape law developed to secure for women the authority to make sexual
choices on an equal basis to men. After examining the substantive definition of rape,
however, the critics conclude that the law has failed-with a vengeance-to preserve
for women a meaningful sphere of sexual self-governance, relegating their sexuality
instead to male control.
Momentarily setting aside the sexual intercourse element, the primary ingredients
of the rape offense are "force" and victim "nonconsent." Remarkably, William
Blackstone's concise description of the traditional elements of rape nicely captures
the definition that is extant in most jurisdictions in this country today. According to
Blackstone, rape is "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her
will.' 4 The critics interpret the phrase "against her will" as a synonym for
"nonconsent,"'' 5 and their objection to this element focuses on the manner in which
it is applied by the courts. As the critics remark, in most jurisdictions today,
nonconsent is not established by proof that the woman verbally refused the man's
sexual advances, 6 but requires the prosecution to show that she offered him some
"physical" resistance as well. t7 Since they assume that the purpose of rape law is to
protect female sexual agency, the critics are understandably distressed by the notion
that the law would require the woman to announce her choice through physical rather
14. 4 WILLIAM]BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIm 210 (Oceana Pub. 1966).
15. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 29 ("Female nonconsent has long been viewed as the key element in the
definition of rape."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L. &
PHIL. 35, 63 (1992) ("[A]nalysts searching for a single organizing principle had to recognize that legally, the gist
of rape was... noneonsent."); see also POSNER, supra note 8, at 388 ("[A]II that distinguishes [rape] from ordinary
sexual intercourse is lack of consent.").
16. Indeed, at common law, many courts treated the woman who explicitly, but only, said "no" as if she had
consented to the encounter. For example, in Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 648 (1897), the Supreme Court
took the position that, though the woman "object verbally, if she make no outcry and no resistance, she, by her
conduct, consents, and the act is not rape in the man."
17. As the author of a treatise on sexual offenses explains, "most courts continue to inquire into the woman's
'earnest resistance' to establish nonconsent," despite the recent wave of reforms that have transformed the language
of most states' rape statutes. B. ANTHONY MoRosco, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 3. 10[3].
at 3-9 (1996).
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than verbal means. Indeed, the critics wonder, why should the woman be required to
do more than utter the word "no" in order to establish her lack of consent to a sexual
proposal? 8 The critics' hostility towards the physical resistance requirement is
exacerbated by their discovery that the requirement appears to be unique to rape
cases. For example, as Vivian Berger and Susan Estrich have noticed, other crimes,
such as robbery, require proof of victim nonconsent, but in those cases, the courts
have not imposed on victims any physical resistance requirement. 19 By singling out
the victims of rape to bear this special burden, which makes it more difficult to bring
their assailants to justice, lawmakers promote, rather than restrain, male domination
of female sexuality.
Likewise, the critics object to the traditional construction of the "force" element
of rape, which is satisfied only by proof of actual physical violence or threats of
grievous bodily harm.'n Surely, the critics argue, since the purpose of the rape
prohibition is to protect female sexual autonomy, the law should recognize a much
broader range of practices as being coercive or otherwise as constituting an unlawful
invasion of women's agency. Indeed, some critics argue that the definition of rape
should not include a force element at all since nonconsensual sex is the injury that
the law seeks to prevent. As Catharine MacKinnon puts it, "In a critique of male
supremacy, the elements 'with force and without consent' appear redundant. Force
is present because consent is absent.",21 Similarly, Susan Estrich wonders why courts
are unable to perceive that sexual intercourse inevitably is forceful when it occurs
after the woman has said "no." In this context, Estrich again draws an analogy bet-
ween rape and robbery. Thus, she speculates, "Certainly, if a thief stripped his
victim, flattened that victim on the floor, lay down on top, and took the victim's
wallet or jewelry, few would pause before concluding forcible robbery." By
limiting rape to only the most egregious intrusions on female sexual autonomy,
namely, those involving serious physical violence, the law validates other coercive
strategies that men employ to obtain sex from unwilling women and thereby safe-
guards an expansive domain for aggressive male sexuality.
Now, let us try to imagine what the elements of rape should be if we replace late
twentieth-century liberal sexual conventions with the sexual mores of the culture
from which we inherited rape law. Contrary to the assumptions animating the
18. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 102 ("'Consent' should be defined so that no means no.").
19. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1977) ("By contrast, in a crime like robbery, also 'a nonconsensual and forcible version of an ordinary
human interaction,' the law imposes no special buiden of [physical] opposition."); Estrich, supra note 13, at 29,
40-41 ("Rape is unique.., in the definition that has been given to nonconsent-one that has required victims of
rape, unlike victims of any other crime, to demonstrate their 'wishes' through physical resistance.").
20. Traditionally, the definition of rape has required the prosecution to prove either that the man used
physical violence to overcome the woman's resistance or that he threatened to kill or maim her if she refused to
submit. See Morosco, supra note 17, §§ 3.01[3], 3.10[3], at 3-9, 3-151.
21. MACKINNON,supra note 7, at 172.
22. Estrich, supra note 13, at 59.
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contemporary critique of rape law, influential institutions within that former world
held that sexuality was a force so dangerous that it should be restricted, on pain of
criminal punishment, to marital partners. In other words, contrary to our norms,
sexual activity formerly was a matter that the state refused to consign to self deter-
mination. When a law enforcement official in that former world heard the word
"rape," therefore, his first association was that, by definition, the encounter involved
activity in which both participants were forbidden to engage. For this official, the
sexual intercourse reported by the woman amounted, in the first instance, to forni-
cation or adultery, and, only in the second instance, to rape if it appeared that her
participation was forced by the man. In the light of this association between inter-
course and criminal guilt, we must wonder, how would our hypothetical official go
about the task of deciding which kind of intercourse had occurred-was it rape, for
which the man alone should be punished, or was it fornication or adultery, for which
both the man and the woman should be blamed? Significantly, the latter inter-
pretation presumably could issue on the basis of the rape complaint alone since the
complaint necessarily represented an admission by the woman that her body was the
site of illegal intercourse. Since that was the case, it would seem both logical and
efficient for the official to resolve the matter by treating the woman's guilty partici-
pation as a given, unless she were able to identify some reason to allocate the blame
for her criminal misconduct to the man, rather than to herself. To frame the inquiry
in the terminology familiar to contemporary criminal law theorists, the official would
be inclined to punish the woman for committing fornication or adultery, unless she
came forward with evidence supporting an excuse to criminal liability.
In order to identify what the woman's potential excuse might be and how that
excuse would condition the content of rape doctrine, it is helpful to revise Susan
Estrich's robbery analogy. For our hypothetical official, the analogy that Estrich
actually proposes would be unpersuasive because, according to his way of thinking
about sexuality, the victims of rape and the victims of robbery do not occupy
analogous legal positions. Indeed, for this official, the legal status of the underlying
activity reported in the two cases was entirely dissimilar. Unlike the victim of a
robbery, who did nothing illegal if she gave away her money freely or by force, the
victim of a rape herself was guilty of a crime if she freely gave away her sexual
favors. Thus, according to this official's way of thinking, a more convincing analogy
would be to compare the woman who claimed she was raped to a person who
confessed that she had committed a robbery but further argued that she should not be
blamed for the crime because another person had coerced her participation. With this
revised analogy as our guide, then, we may begin to capture the premises that our law
enforcement official would have in mind as he approached the adjudication of a rape
complaint.
Assuming that he shared our contemporary hostility towards excuse defenses,
the official initially would be inclined to blame both the putative robber and the
putative fornicator. Certainly, he would not be disposed to relieve either offender
from liability merely because she reported that she was reluctant to accede to her
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confederate's illegal pecuniary or sexual proposal. Nor would he be moved to spare
her if she testified that she had articulated her subjective feeling of reluctance ver-
bally, for example, by telling her confederate "no" when he asked her to participate.
Rather, to take only the most obvious defensive route that the offender might be
required to pursue,23 we must imagine that our official would insist that the robber
or fornicator demonstrate that she had participated in the crime under circumstances
satisfying the duress defense. Indeed, he would refuse to excuse the offender unless
she could establish that: (1) she had committed the offense under threats of death or
grievous bodily injury; and (2) there was no strategy that she could have adopted,
including efforts physically to resist her coercer, to avoid committing the crime.24 In
short, when we take seriously the association between sexual intercourse and
criminal guilt, we discover that the elements that define the crime of rape-threats
of violence serious enough to overcome physical resistance by the victim-are
precisely the same elements that excuse the woman for having sex.
IV.
Since the argument sketched herein is one that I intend to develop more fully in
future papers, it seems prudent to consider the political implications of my attempt
to refocus the law of rape. Whose interests are served by my claim that rape
represents a woman's excuse, rather than a man's crime? For what it is worth, my
intention is not to rehabilitate the traditional definition of rape. Although my account
may suggest that the prohibition was shaped by a congeries of social and legal forces,
of which misogyny was only one factor, my intention is to reinforce and extend the
criticisms offered by those who would revise rape doctrine so that it is more sensitive
to the feminist critique of heterosexuality. As we pursue this law reform project, it
seems crucial to know as much as possible about the alternative ways of thinking
about sexuality that produced the legal definition we desire to revise. For example,
if we discover that the content of rape doctrine was influenced, if not determined, by
the prohibitions on fornication and adultery, then liberal and feminist scholars must
begin to take those prohibitions much more seriously than they have been inclined
to do. To say the least, if the function of the elements of rape is to identify those
women who should be excused for committing fornication or adultery, feminists
cannot afford to ignore those offenses or to treat them as the quaint artifacts of a
bygone era. If my thesis is correct, the fornication andadultery laws constitute "dead
letter statutes"' only insofar as men are concerned. For women, these laws retain a
vital prohibitory power since they have been incorporated into the definition of rape
23. Depending on the circumstances under which they acted, these hypothetical offenders might also be able
to challenge either the actus reus or the mens rea elements of the crimes for which they were charged.
24. For a helpful description and critique of the traditional elements of duress, see 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINA. LAw DEFENSES 348-72 (1984).
25. AMERIcANLAINSrrUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 213, at 435 (1980).
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that is extant today, and, from that location, they continue to require women to prove
that they have a legal excuse for engaging in sexual intercourse outside of marriage.
This inclination to demand more knowledge about sexuality constrains me to
return to the point where I started. Justice Ginsburg's story suggests that it is naive
for feminists to believe that the production of knowledge about our sexual experi-
ences can release women from their subjugated position in our culture. How can we
expect that more talk about sex, let alone the investigations undertaken to produce
such talk, could serve a liberatory enterprise when merely uttering the word "sex"
conjures up images that reproduce the terms of our subjugation? The best we might
hope is to produce the spurious "speaker's benefit" identified by Michel Foucault,
which attaches to one daring enough to transgress the cultural injunction against
talking about sex in public. 6 Indeed, the existence of this speaker's benefit may
provide an additional and different reason for obeying Justice Ginsburg's injunction
to avoid certain distracting words: some of us might be tempted to choose silence
over forms of speech that make us professional traders in the suffering that we
ostensibly would relieve.
Yet, those suffering others well may wonder, whose interests are served by such
linguistic punctiliousness? Surely if the history of violent sexuality has taught us
anything, it is that the interests of rape victims are not served by euphemism, let
alone by silence. Therefore, feminists must continue to talk about sex, but, mindful
of Justice Ginsburg's warning, they also must be willing to think seriously about the
ways in which talk about sex-including that uttered by feminists themselves-
exercises dominion over our laws and our lives.
26. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALrrY 6 (1978) (Robert Hurley trans.).
